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Plaintiff, who brought a civil suit for damages on a valid cause of
action against Chicago City officials under the Federal Civil Rights Act,'
was subsequently convicted of certain federal crimes and confined to the
United States Penitentiary at Alcatraz Island, California. Interrogatories
were filed by a defendant and stipulation was made to take the plaintiff's
deposition in Chicago. Petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum
was denied by the district court and without the plaintiff's presence the
trial was unable to continue. The cause was dismissed. Held, the writ was
properly denied for lack of jurisdiction under the "all writs" statute.2
Edgerly v. Kennelly, 215 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1954).
A distinction is to be noted between the several types of habeas corpus
writs.8 Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is the most common4 and is
"... the essential remedy to safeguard a citizen against imprisonment by
State or Nation in violation of his constitutional rights.",, Habeas corpus
ad testificandum does not inquire into the alleged unlawful detention of
the petitioner8 but issues, ". . . for the production of witnesses who are
confined in jail and who are beyond the reach of the ordinary subpoena.
The issuance of such writ was at common law discretionary."'
The great mass of cases interpreting the habeas corpus statute8 hold
that the writ has no effect beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing
1. 17 STAT. 13-15 (1871), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (1954).
2. STAT. 81-82 (1789), 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1952), "The Supreme Court and all
courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary and appropriate in
aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of
law .......
3. 3 BL. CoMM. 129-132; 39 C.J.S. 424-428; 9 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENcLiSH LAw 108-125 (3d ed. 1944); Vol. 19, WORDS AND PHRASES (penn. ed.)
"Habeas Corpus."
5. Darr v. Buford, 339 U.S. 200, 203 (1950).
4. Gilmore v. United States, 129 F.2d 199, 204 (10th Cir. 1942); Grieve v.
Webb, 22 Wash. 2d 902, 903, 158 P.2d 73, 74 (1945).
6. Cuckovich v. United States, 170 F.2d 89, 90 (6th Cir. 1948); United States
v. Rollnick, 33 F. Supp. 863, 866 (M.D. Pa. 1940).
7. Cuckovich v. United States, 170 F.2d 89, 90 (6th Cir. 1948); Bugg v. United
States, 140 F.2d. 848, 850 (8th Cir. 1944); Murrey v. United States, 138 F.2d 94, 97(8th Cir. 1943); 8 WIOMORE EVIDENCE 2199 .(3d ed. 1940); 70 C. J., Witnesses § 64M135).8. 36 STAT. 1167 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1952), "Writs of habeas corpus
may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any
circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions" . . . and they "may transfer the applica-
tion for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it."
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court.9 It has been argued that this jurisdictional limitation is explanatory
of and must be read into the "all writs" statute,'0 because, generally, valid
exceptions to a statute must be express although certain implied exceptions
may be made where necessary." Such an express exception seems to be
inherent in 28 U.S.C. § 225512 which was created to somewhat limit the
widespread use and abuse of the habeas corpus petition in certain juris-
dictions.' 3 Similarly, under a provision of the Bankruptcy Act 4 imprisoned
bankrupts are subject to court orders to testify and such orders have run
beyond the territorial limits of the bankruptcy court and produced prisoners
therefrom.' 5 The District Coirt for the District of Columbia was apparently
privileged to have writs run outside of the territorial limits of the District.
6
This jurisdictional problem is often solved by the determination of who
has custody of the prisoner.I'
Should the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum be made an implied
exception to the jurisdictional rule? The usual situation involving the use
of this writ calls for the witness to appear and give testimony in criminal
proceedings, and on several occasions the writ has issued to bring the
witness from a federal penitentiary into a foreign state. 8 Some cases refusing
the writ have indicated that were there a good reason for the prisoner's
appearance it would be granted.' 9 Still other courts have rationalized refusal
9. Abrens v. Clark, Att'v Gen., 335 U.S. 188, 190-193 (1948); McAfee v.
Clemmer, 171 F.2d 131 (D.C. Cir, 1948); United States ex tel. Circella v. Neely, 115
F. Supp. 615 620-622 (ND. 111. 1953): United States ex rel. Dorsch v. Hunter. 101
F. Supp. 751 (W.D. Pa, 1951), aff'd, 196 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1952); United States
ex rel. Smith v. Warden of Philadelphia County Prison, 87 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1949),
aff'd, 181 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1950); Phillips v. Hiatt, 83 F. Supp. 935, 937 (D. Del.
1949); Fiedler v. Shuttleworth, 57 F. Supp. 591, 592 (W.D. Pa. 1944).
10. See note 1 supra; Phillips v Hiatt, 83 F. Supp. 935, 937-938 (D. Del. 1949).
11. 82 C.J.S., Statutes § 382(b) (1953).
12. 62 STAT. 967 (1948); "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court estab-
lished by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released . . . may move the court
which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. . . . A court
may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the
prisoner at the hearing .. "
13. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S.
266, 292-301 (1948); REPORT O' THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 22-24 (1943).
14. 30 STAT. 544 (1898),, as amended, 11 U.SC. § 53, Order 30 (1952).
15. United States ex tel. Marsino v. Anderson, 18 F. 133 (N.D. 111. 1927); In re
Thaw, 166 Fed. 71 (3d Cir. 1908)(witness would have been produced in court but for
his insanity).
16. Noble v. Botkin, 153 P.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Downey v. United States,
91 F.2d 223, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1937); this privilege was terminated by virtue of Ahrens
v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948); see McAfee v. Clemmer, 171 F.2d 131, 132 (D.C. Cir.
1948).
17. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948); United States v. Quinn, 69 F. Supp.
488 (N.D. Ill. 1946); 3 .MIAMI L.Q. 52 (1948).
18. United States v. Quinn, 69 F. Supp. 488 (N.D. II. 1946); United States ex rel.
Patterson v. Brady, 57 F. Supp. 93 (D. Md. 1944); Sanders v. Brady, 57 F . Supp. 87
(D, Md. 1944); In re Hamilton, 11 Fed. Cas. No. 5, 976, at 319 (S.D. N.Y. 1867).
19. Tatum v, United States, 204 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1953); Gilmore v. United
States. 129 F.2d 199 (10th Cir. 1942); Gibson v. United States. 53 F.2d 721
8th Cir. 1931); United States v. Chinn, 74 F. Supp. 189 (S.D. W.Va. 1947); Ex parte
mith, 145 Me. 174, 74 A.2d 225 (1950); 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.11 pp.
1056, 1057.
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of the writ by saying there was too much possibility of escape;20 or the
inconvenience was too great;2 1 or the expense was prohibitive.22 It has
been suggested that in view of these considerations, depositions be taken
at the place of confinement;23 or that the sworn affidavits made by the
prisoner-witness be filed with the court for use in the proceedings.2 4 Quite
obviously, a mere piece of paper precludes the benefit of personal testimony
both as to the petitioning party and as to the judge and jury.25 Beale
states, "It is*a general rule of law that where one has become subject to
the jurisdiction of a court, the jurisdiction continues in all proceedings
arising out of the litigation such as appeals and writs of error."'20 However,
the argument that a district court which puts the prisoner in question
beyond its territorial limits retains the power to bring the same person
again therein has been refuted.27
The decision in this case can perhaps be attributed in part to the
social stigma attaching to prisons and prisoners, and the consequent
reticence of judges to allow the release of convicted criminals for a few
days even under the most desirous of circumstances. It appears that it
would have afforded a more equitable and reasonable solution to deny
the petition on the basis of the court's discretion rather than to so
soundly seal the door by applying the "no-jurisdiction, no-writ" rule; for
it is conceivable that a similar situation in the future might demand a




The defendant was indicted for selling intoxicants to Indians.1 A
general demurrer was sustained by the lower courts2 and the state appealed.
I-eld: A statute prohibiting sale of intoxicants to Indians is not violative
20. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 191 (1948); Price v. 'Johnston, 159 F.2d 234
236, 237 (9th Cir. 1947); Ex parte Bagwell, 79 P.2d 395, 397 (Calif. 1938).
21. United States v, Iayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210-219 (1952); Ahrens v. Clark, supra
note 22; Price v. Johnston, supra note 22; Contra, United States v. Quinn, 69 F. Supp.
488, 492 (N.D. Il. 1946) (. , . if jurisdiction depends upon the matter of convenience,
the convenience of the petitioner far outweighs that of the Goverment or the court).
22. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 191 (1948); Price v. Johnston, 159 F.2d 234,
236, 237 (9th Cir. 1937); Brewer v. United States, 150 F.2d 314, 315 (9th Cir. 1945);
Neufield v. United States, 118 F.2d 375, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Ex parte Bagwell, 79
P.2d 395, 396 (Calif. 1938).
23. State v. Brown, 89 So. 862 (Ala. 1921); Ex parte Bagwell, 79 P.2d 395, 396
(Calif. 1938); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
24. Murrey v. United States, 138 F.2d 94, 97 (8th Cir. 1943); United States
v. Chinn, 74 F. Supp. 189, 190 (S.D. W.Va. 1947).
25. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 280 (1948).
26. 1 BEALE, Tu CONFLICT OX LAWS § 76.1 (1st ed. 1935).
27. Hauck v. Hiatt, 50 F. Supp. 534, 535 (W.D. S.C. 1943).
1. IDAHO CODE, § 18-4201 (1879).
2. Justice of the Peace Court and District Court of Bingham County.
